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The Neo-Hamiltonian Temptation 
abstract.  The central force behind the development of constitutional law, according to 
Bruce Ackerman’s magisterial We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution, is not the courts but the 
People, acting through the elected officials who were responsible for the civil rights laws of the 
1960s. But if, as Professor Ackerman emphasizes, the Constitution should be interpreted to 
reflect actual decisions made by the People—rather than decisions attributed to the People by 
creative interpreters—it is not clear what room is left for judicial review. Ackerman shows that a 
true popular consensus against Jim Crow segregation did, eventually, emerge. But many well-
settled principles of constitutional law have been established by courts without the support of 
such a consensus. No such consensus supported Brown v. Board of Education itself, when it was 
decided.  
 To a greater extent than Professor Ackerman perhaps recognizes, his account may even ally 
him with skeptics who would abolish judicial review—skeptics who also, albeit in a different 
way, believe that the Constitution should be entrusted to the People. The great challenge to 
those skeptics is that they would repudiate Brown. Ackerman celebrates Brown, but he also shows 
that the civil rights era was an extraordinary time in which the nation eventually united to finish 
the work of the Civil War. The logic of Ackerman’s account suggests (although he may not 
intend the suggestion) that Brown was an extra-legal but morally justified intervention that was 
needed to start this process—and was therefore a historically exceptional event that can be 
accepted as consistent with general skepticism about judicial review. 
 
author. Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago 
Law School. I am grateful to the Yale Law Journal for inviting me to present this paper at a 
symposium on Bruce Ackerman’s We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution. I also thank 
Professor Ackerman and the other participants in the symposium for comments on an earlier 
version of this paper, and the Burton and Adrienne Glazov Faculty Fund at the University of 
Chicago Law School for financial support.
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i .  the temptation 
The U.S. Constitution is the work of “We the People.” As a formal matter, 
the People can, if enough of them feel strongly about it, amend the text. Bruce 
Ackerman, with characteristic subtlety and sophistication, makes the important 
point that the People actually change the Constitution in other ways. One way 
or another, though, the People are the final authority on what the Constitution 
requires. 
But the U.S. Constitution also protects minorities against wrongful 
treatment by the majority. The protection of property-holding minorities was a 
central theme during the Founding. The most celebrated chapter in twentieth-
century constitutional law, described in Ackerman’s third volume, secured the 
rights of the African-American minority to be free from state-imposed 
segregation.1 And the Constitution is routinely celebrated as a refuge for 
despised minorities. 
To say that the Constitution is ultimately responsive to We the People is to 
say that it is responsive to the will of the majority, somehow defined. But then 
there is a problem: how can the Constitution both implement the will of the 
majority and protect minorities? One way to solve the problem is to establish 
institutions that have the responsibility of protecting minorities against the 
People. One can imagine many such possible institutions. A hereditary 
aristocracy might conceivably play such a role. Political institutions might be 
structured to insulate some elected officials from popular opinion in a way that 
allows them to protect minorities, or the political culture may provide that kind 
of insulation. Or judges might play that role by exercising the power of judicial 
review. That last option is, of course, the one envisioned by the Carolene 
Products footnote,2 a central justification for judicial review in the post-New 
Deal era. 
Once we allow institutions like those into the picture, though, we just 
create another set of familiar problems. We have to justify those institutions’ 
exercise of power. Which minorities should be protected, and when, and in 
what ways? These other institutions will have to make those judgments. How 
are they to make those judgments, and how can we be confident enough that 
they will make good judgments? Beyond that, how can we be sufficiently 
confident that these other institutions won’t abuse their authority, consciously 
or unconsciously using the supposed protection of minorities as a pretext for 
doing something else? 
 
1.  3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
2.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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Rule by the People has, for most of us, immediate democratic legitimacy; 
in some sense, it does not need to be justified. Rule by elites—that is what we 
are talking about if we establish institutions that derogate from rule by the 
People—is much harder to justify. Of course, this contrast between elites and 
the People is overdrawn. There is no single way of identifying what the People 
want; their various preferences have to be aggregated by some mechanism. 
And any realistic mechanism of rule by the People will involve the 
intermediation of elites—governing officials, opinion leaders, and the like. But 
deliberately insulating an elite from popular opinion raises special concerns and 
requires special justification. It seems, though, that we must have just that kind 
of insulation in order to protect minorities. 
Professor Ackerman’s third volume of We the People proposes, among other 
important things, a different way of solving these problems. In fact, Ackerman 
can be read as denying that these problems exist. The civil rights revolution, he 
says, was the product of a persistent national majority. He is certainly right 
that Jim Crow segregation was ultimately rejected by both major political 
parties and all three branches of government. This broad consensus did not 
formally amend the Constitution, but in practical terms it brought about a 
major change in U.S. constitutionalism. So Ackerman says, and he is 
persuasive. In Ackerman’s telling, there was no tension or paradox. We the 
People effectively changed the Constitution in a way that secured the rights of a 
minority. 
This is a very appealing vision. Judges and judicial review play a role in 
Ackerman’s account, as do other political figures who enjoyed some insulation 
from immediate popular sentiment. But the responsibility of these elites was, 
in Ackerman’s vision, to listen to the People and to implement their will. The 
intuitive democratic justification for rule by the People extends throughout the 
system. Institutions justified in that way will, on Ackerman’s account, protect 
minorities. The civil rights era is dramatic evidence of that. 
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton defended judicial review against the 
argument that it “supposes a superiority of the judicial to the legislative 
power.”3 Hamilton said that, on the contrary, judicial review “only supposes 
that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the 
legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people 
declared in the [C]onstitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter 
rather than the former.”4 Ackerman is a neo-Hamiltonian. Judges exercise 
power in his system, but we do not need a separate justification for that. It all 
 
3.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
4.  Id. 
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comes back to the will of the People. Ackerman, to his credit, does not accept 
Hamilton’s suggestion that the will of the People is embedded in the written 
Constitution alone. We the People have other ways of changing the 
Constitution. But the Constitution—including the ways in which it protects 
minorities—is all the work of We the People. 
It would be great if Ackerman’s powerful and inspiring vision worked. But 
I do not believe it does. To be specific, I do not think it is an adequate account 
of much of American constitutional law, including central aspects of 
constitutional law that Ackerman (like many of the rest of us) celebrates. In 
fact, I do not think it is even a fully adequate account of the civil rights 
revolution. I do think that Ackerman’s view potentially points the way toward 
a radical revision of American constitutionalism—a revision that would 
effectively eliminate judicial review and would treat what the courts did in the 
civil rights era as a form of morally imperative civil disobedience. That 
revisionist view is not totally unappealing, but it is a radical revision, and I do 
not believe Ackerman would endorse it. 
In our system, the Constitution can be best understood, I think, not as the 
work of the People in Ackerman’s sense but rather on the model of the 
common law. The common law model shares with Ackerman the idea that 
there is much more to the Constitution than just the document. But the 
common law view emphasizes not relatively discrete acts by the People but, 
instead, precedents and traditions that often evolve over time. Perhaps more 
important, the common law approach also acknowledges that the Constitution 
is, unavoidably, shaped in part by judgments of morality and policy made by 
the people who interpret it. This is all part of the common law tradition, a 
tradition with deep roots in our legal system. Judges who enforce the 
Constitution are not implementing the decisions of the People in Ackerman’s 
sense; they are acting according to the norms of the common law. Of course, 
everyone, not just judges, plays a role in enforcing the Constitution; judges 
may not even be the most important actors. But it is their commitment to a 
common law method, not simply allegiance to the will of People, that justifies 
their role. Judges and others resolve the questions about which minorities 
should be protected, and how, in that way—with attention to precedent and 
explicit acknowledgment of the moral issues at stake. That, I believe, is our 
system, and it is illustrated by both the civil rights revolution and 
constitutional law generally. 
The neo-Hamiltonian vision is tempting because it promises the virtues of 
our constitutional system without fully confronting the ways in which our 
system is not democratic. We have, in our system, actors—like judges—with 
limited incentives to respond to popular will. Sometimes those actors make 
decisions that are crucially dependent on their own judgments about matters of 
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policy or morality. Maybe these undemocratic elements are not good. We the 
People might do a good enough job protecting minorities; Ackerman’s account 
of the civil rights era certainly provides evidence for that claim. If that is true, 
then we could diminish the power of the courts (and maybe other elites) and 
have a better system. Or maybe not; maybe our system is better than a more 
democratic alternative. But in any event we should confront and analyze these 
undemocratic elements of our system—elements that do not answer to We the 
People in the way Ackerman describes. 
In the next Part of this essay, I will discuss the constitutional law governing 
sex discrimination. That body of law—well established by now—illustrates 
some of the strengths of Ackerman’s approach. But it also illustrates the 
weaknesses of Ackerman’s approach and, I want to suggest, the relative 
strengths of the common law account. The constitutional law of sex 
discrimination developed in the shadow of the civil rights revolution; indeed, 
Ackerman suggests that it can be attributed to decisions that We the People 
made. The strengths and weaknesses of Ackerman’s account in this context 
might, for those reasons, fairly suggest what its strengths and weaknesses are 
throughout constitutional law generally. 
After that, I will suggest that Ackerman’s account—important and 
enormously illuminating as it is—does not fully explain even the civil rights 
revolution in constitutional law. In conclusion, I will suggest where a 
thoroughgoing neo-Hamiltonian approach might lead: to an understanding of 
the civil rights revolution as an extraordinary event rather than a template for 
constitutional change, and to a sharply diminished role for judicial review. 
i i .  a case study: sex discrimination 
The development of the constitutional principles governing sex 
discrimination forced the courts to grapple, implicitly and explicitly, with 
fundamental questions regarding their role. But at the same time, because the 
sex discrimination cases involved a less dramatic series of events than the civil 
rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, those cases provide some insight into 
the more routine aspects of constitutional law. An early sex discrimination case, 
Frontiero v. Richardson,5 forced to the surface some of the central issues about 
how constitutional law develops. In Frontiero, which was decided in 1973, the 
Supreme Court considered whether classifications based on sex, “like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently 
 
5.  411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
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suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny”6—strict 
scrutiny, as we would call it today. 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, concluded that sex-
based classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny. Justice Brennan made 
two main arguments. One was an analogy to race discrimination: Justice 
Brennan compared the treatment of women, both at the time and in the past, 
to the treatment of African Americans.7 Women, although numerically a 
majority, were treated like a minority—treated enough like African Americans 
to justify a similar constitutional rule. Justice Brennan also made an argument 
that, superficially at least, anticipated the approach Professor Ackerman takes 
in his book. Justice Brennan noted that, over the previous decade, Congress 
had “manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications.”8 He 
mentioned Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 
1963, which outlawed sex discrimination in employment.9 He also said: 
[Section] 1 of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on 
March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the States for 
ratification, declares that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex.” Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based 
upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal 
branch of Government is not without significance to the question 
presently under consideration.10 
Justice Brennan did not get a majority for the position that sex-based 
classifications should get strict scrutiny. Justice Powell, in a concurring 
opinion, agreed that the particular classification at issue in Frontiero was 
unconstitutional but concluded that the Court should not hold that sex 
classifications are suspect.11 Justice Powell did not take issue with Justice 
Brennan’s account of the discrimination women faced, past and present. But 
Justice Powell drew exactly the opposite lesson from Justice Brennan about the 
significance of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. He said that a 
“compelling” reason for the Court not to treat sex classifications as suspect was 
that the ERA, “which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise 
 
6.  Id. at 682 (footnotes omitted). 
7.  Id. at 685. 
8.  Id. at 687. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. at 687-88 (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972)). 
11.  Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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question,” had been submitted to the states.12 “If this Amendment is duly 
adopted,” Justice Powell said, “it will represent the will of the people 
accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.” The Court 
should not “pre-empt . . . a major political decision which is currently in 
process of resolution.”13 
These opinions—both of them—vividly present the paradox of a 
Constitution that is the work of We the People but that is supposed to 
authorize the courts to protect minorities. Was the fact that Congress had 
ratified the proposed ERA and sent it to the states a reason to treat sex-based 
classifications as suspect, as Justice Brennan contended, because it showed that 
there was popular support for that course? Or was the proposed ERA a reason 
for the courts to wait, as Justice Powell said, because We the People had not yet 
spoken? Neither of those conclusions seems obviously wrong. 
Following Ackerman’s approach, this question can be taken outside of the 
context of a formal amendment. One might say that Justice Brennan, like 
Ackerman, gives the civil rights statutes something akin to constitutional 
status. At least, in Justice Brennan’s view, the Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution was properly influenced by what Congress had done. Is Justice 
Brennan’s point then that the People have spoken—by enacting civil rights 
laws and even approving the proposed ERA by supermajorities in both houses 
of Congress—and the People have declared that women are entitled to judicial 
protection against discrimination? But if that is the basis of Justice Brennan’s 
conclusion, his recitation of the ways in which women are discriminated 
against seems to be beside the point. If the reason to make sex-based 
classifications suspect is that the People have effectively commanded that 
result, then the history of discrimination and the analogies to race are 
misleading. Today—on this Ackerman-like reading of Justice Brennan’s 
opinion—women have the People on their side. One might even ask: why, 
then, do they need the protection of having courts treat sex-based 
classifications as suspect? Why can’t the courts just enforce the statutes that the 
People’s representatives have enacted? 
But perhaps the way to read Justice Brennan’s opinion is that women are 
functionally a minority, lacking the political power to protect themselves 
against discrimination at the hands of the majority. If that is the rationale for 
treating sex-based classifications as suspect, then the discussion of the anti-
discrimination laws and the ERA is a potentially misleading distraction. On 
 
12.  Id. at 692. 
13.  Id. 
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this reading, the apparent willingness of the People to battle sex discrimination 
is just an illusion. 
Justice Powell’s opinion reflects a different side of the paradox. His view 
was that the question whether women should get special protection under the 
Constitution was pending in front of the ultimate authority—the People—and 
the Court should not preempt the decision. The ratification of the ERA, on 
Justice Powell’s view, would justify treating sex-based classifications as 
suspect; the rejection of the ERA would establish that they should not be 
treated as suspect. But this approach, too, seems vulnerable. Wouldn’t the 
failure of ratification show that women were in fact more like a minority 
entitled to judicial protection? 
Judging from the way things turned out, what We the People concluded 
about the ERA itself didn’t matter. The ERA, of course, was not adopted. But 
while the Court has never held that sex-based classifications are to be treated as 
suspect in the same way that racial classifications are, the Court has invalidated 
many sex-based classifications under “intermediate scrutiny.”14 In fact, it is 
difficult to identify any way in which the law would be different today if the 
ERA had been adopted. The plight of the ERA confirms something that 
Ackerman’s account shares with the common law approach: formal 
amendments are not that important. 
In fact, I think Ackerman understates this point. Amending the text of the 
Constitution has not been an important way of changing the U.S. 
constitutional system. Sometimes, as with the expansion of the powers of the 
federal government during the twentieth century, changes of constitutional 
magnitude have happened without formal amendments. Sometimes, as with 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, formal amendments were mostly 
nullified for a long time until conditions changed and the amendments could 
be enforced. Sometimes amendments make only relatively technical 
adjustments, or they mop up outliers after a fundamental change has already 
happened. And sometimes, as with the ERA, a proposed amendment is 
formally rejected but de facto adopted.15  
Ackerman’s willingness to recognize that formal amendments are not the 
only way of changing our constitutional system is part of what makes his neo-
Hamiltonian vision distinctive and plausible. It is very difficult to make the 
argument that courts are simply enforcing the formal text of the Constitution. 
 
14.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny for sex-
based classifications). 
15.  For an argument along these lines, see David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional 
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
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Too many established principles of constitutional law just cannot be connected 
to the text in a straightforward way. But if you recognize, as Ackerman does, 
that We the People might change the Constitution by means other than formal 
amendment, you can give a more plausible account of constitutional law today. 
There is a second way in which the development of the constitutional law 
about sex-based classifications seems consistent with Ackerman’s approach. 
Ackerman says that the civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s should be 
regarded as part of the “constitutional canon.” I am not entirely sure what it 
means to say that something is part of the constitutional canon, but Frontiero 
suggests that the courts are willing to treat those statutes as a potential source 
of constitutional law. Of course, Frontiero is just one data point; the Brennan 
opinion was only for a plurality; and Justice Brennan’s other arguments, 
drawing on the analogy to race discrimination, may have been sufficient by 
themselves to justify closer scrutiny of sex-based classifications. But the 
subsequent development of constitutional law in this area actually suggests 
that, if anything, Ackerman does not cast his net wide enough. Not just 
statutes, but lots of other things going on in society, seem to be sources of 
constitutional law. 
Specifically, it is hard to believe that changes in the status of women in 
society and in the economy did not make the courts more willing to reject sex-
based classifications, just as it is hard to believe that changes in the social status 
of gays haven’t affected more recent decisions having to do with discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. For reasons I will give later, these were not 
just causal influences; they are part of the justification for what the courts have 
done. The one puzzling feature of Ackerman’s account, for me, is his repeated 
suggestions that “lawyers” do not understand that there are various legitimate 
influences on constitutional law beyond the formal text of the Constitution.16 
While there is an academic literature devoted to trying to show that all of 
constitutional law can be derived from the text, I think practicing lawyers 
understand very well the limited role of the constitutional text and the variety 
of sources that they can draw on. I will return to these issues below. 
In more fundamental ways, though, I believe that the sex discrimination 
cases illustrate the limits of Ackerman’s approach. In particular, it is hard to 
square those decisions with the notion that We the People are the source of 
constitutional law in the way Ackerman envisions.17 The decisive, crowning 
 
16.  See, e.g., 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that conventional constitutional lawyers 
have “failed” the challenge of understanding popular constitutional change). 
17.  Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002), argues that the constitutional law governing sex 
discrimination should have “take[n] its critical and normative bearings from the debates 
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events that Ackerman describes in connection with the civil rights movement 
did not have counterparts in the movement for women’s equality. Of course 
there was such a movement, and it had its victories. But no presidential 
election was run with women’s equality as a central issue. There was no 
moment at which a filibuster was dramatically broken. No conservative 
politicians made speeches about sex discrimination that were like Senator 
Dirksen’s “idea whose time has come” speech about race discrimination. There 
was no consolidating election comparable to the description Ackerman gives of 
the 1968 election. In fact, the development of this body of law corresponded 
with the growth of a movement that exalted women’s traditional roles and 
defeated the ERA.18 
One other element of the sex discrimination cases seems to be missing from 
Ackerman’s account of constitutional change. It is impossible to deny that the 
justices’ own views about sex discrimination played a role. If we are going to 
have a theory that explains judicial review as it is practiced in our system today, 
that theory has to explain why, and to what extent, judges’ views about 
morality and social policy can play a role in decisions. 
I do not think Ackerman’s theory gives such an explanation, or even leaves 
room for it. Ackerman says that “[t]he aim of interpretation is to understand 
the historical commitments that have actually been made by the American 
 
over women’s citizenship that begin with the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
culminated over a half century later with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.” Id. 
at 966. This form of “synthetic interpretation,” id., is related to the idea that constitutional 
law is the work of We the People. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS 86-130 (1991). It is not entirely clear what the justification for this method of 
synthesis is, as I say below. But in any event, in the case of sex discrimination, this synthetic 
account is frankly revisionist—at odds with the way the doctrine actually developed. See 
Siegel, supra, at 949. And, on this synthetic account, the decisive act of We the People 
occurred, if I understand correctly, when the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted—well 
before the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
18.  See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986). In fact, Professor Ackerman’s 
treatment of the development of the constitutional law of sex discrimination—which he 
provided in an earlier article, not in We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution—seems to 
abjure the claim that the Court’s decisions in this area were an effort to carry out decisions 
that We the People had made about sex equality. See Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the 
Women’s Movement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1421, 1436 (2006) (asserting that the Court was not 
“thinking of itself as the mouthpiece of the movement struggling for ratification of the 
ERA” and suggesting that the Court was not engaged in “higher lawmaking” but rather in 
“a very conventional exercise in constitutional interpretation”). The question, then, is how 
Professor Ackerman justifies “conventional . . . constitutional interpretation” if the neo-
Hamiltonian rationale—that the interpreter is simply implementing the will of the People—
is inapplicable. 
. 
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people, not those which one or another philosopher thinks they should have 
made”—his emphasis.19 But if the actual commitments are those on which 
there was a consensus comparable to the 1970s consensus against Jim Crow 
segregation, then those actual commitments do not get us nearly far enough. 
For example, it is not clear how one can square what Ackerman says about 
“commitments that have actually been made” with this passage: 
If taken seriously, the principles announced in Earl Warren’s great 
opinion [in Brown] have a broad reach: blacks and women, Muslim and 
Hispanic Americans, the mentally and physically disabled, gays, 
lesbians and the transgendered—all these people often find themselves 
in conditions of institutionalized humiliation. They are all entitled to 
constitutional protection under Brown’s understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause, affirmed by the People during the Second 
Reconstruction.20 
Even if one accepts that the People determined that Jim Crow segregation was 
unconstitutional, in what sense, exactly, did the People actually affirm that all 
of those other groups were also entitled to the same kind of protection as 
African Americans? I don’t know of any evidence that representative voters for 
Lyndon Johnson in 1964 would have said, if asked, that they were casting their 
votes for women’s equality, much less for the constitutional rights of, say, gays, 
lesbians, and transgendered individuals. The idea that those groups were 
entitled to the protection of antidiscrimination norms was nowhere near the 
mainstream at the time. 
If that is so, then the principle that condemns institutionalized humiliation 
generally—outside the context of Jim Crow—has to rely on something more 
than a conscious political decision of the People. Ackerman’s argument that 
Brown, “taken seriously,” supports those claims and, so understood, was 
“affirmed” by the People, requires one to accept both that the expansive 
understanding of Brown is correct and that the People endorsed that 
understanding: that when the People condemned Jim Crow segregation, they 
also entrenched a principle that condemned other forms of “institutionalized 
humiliation” besides racial segregation. But the idea that Brown condemns 
“institutionalized humiliation” generally is just one interpretation of Brown. It 
is an interpretation that many of us may be happy to accept, but on Ackerman’s 
account, it doesn’t matter what many of us (philosophers or not) are happy to 
accept. What matters is what the People “affirmed” in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
19.  3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 34. 
20.  Id. at 335. 
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At this point, I believe, Ackerman’s account runs into the same problems 
that confront less sophisticated forms of originalism. If we attribute to the 
People simply what they consciously thought they were voting for, we cannot 
say that they did any more than abolish Jim Crow (if we can even say that). 
Once we go beyond any plausible account of what the People consciously 
thought they were doing, we have many options—and no neo-Hamiltonian 
way to choose among them. We might, with Ackerman, attribute some more 
general decision to the People, such as a decision to abolish all “institutional 
humiliation.” But what is the justification for attributing to the People that 
decision, as opposed to something more specific, like the abolition of 
discrimination against all racial and ethnic minorities but not discrimination 
against other kinds of minorities? Or maybe we should attribute to the People 
something more general, like the abolition of inequality generally, not just 
those inequalities that are humiliating. Or maybe the People “affirmed” a 
principle that has to do with racial classifications but not the protection of 
minorities, like the principle that race should not be used in government 
decisions, whether it injures or benefits minorities. 
We can choose among these possibilities by attributing to the People a 
decision that is morally better, or more consistent with traditions and 
precedents, or some combination of those things, à la the common law. But 
then we are attributing a decision to the People, not implementing what the 
People actually decided; the neo-Hamiltonian justification does not work, and 
we might as well just explain why we have chosen the right course for the law 
instead of claiming that the People have chosen it for us. Of course there is also 
uncertainty about what the People consciously decided; I have accepted 
Ackerman’s central claim, that there was a genuine national consensus against 
Jim Crow, but others might take issue even with that. As I said, these are 
familiar problems with originalism, and Ackerman’s more sophisticated form 
of originalism does not seem to escape them. 
In the years since the civil rights revolution, the principle of Brown has 
taken a shape that is something like what Ackerman describes. That process of 
extension, or interpretation, or implementation, or synthesis—whatever one 
wants to call it—is the process that must be analyzed and justified. The danger 
here is that the emphasis on We the People obscures what’s involved in this 
process of going beyond the beliefs that We the People actually held, even if we 
agree with Ackerman that We the People made a specific decision about Jim 
Crow and that their decision is the correct starting point. Part of that process 
requires the judges (or elected politicians, who also have these responsibilities) 
to exercise their own judgment about how the consensus should be extended. 
The logic of the attack on Jim Crow should be extended to other forms of 
discrimination because it makes good sense to do so, as a matter of morality 
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and social policy—that is the kind of judgment that the courts, among others, 
were making. What licensed them to make that judgment? The neo-
Hamiltonian temptation is to deny that such a judgment had to be made and to 
attribute it all to We the People. But that is not an accurate account. 
Interpretations of the People’s actions that are in part based on the interpreter’s 
own views should not just be attributed to the People. Those interpretations, 
and the views that support them, should be candidly avowed and opened to 
criticism. 
i i i .  the common law alternative 
The common law, as I said, seems to me to be a better model of 
constitutional development than Ackerman’s neo-Hamiltonian view.21 A 
mention of the common law often conjures an image that is something like the 
opposite of rule by the People. The idea is that the common law is a judge-
centered institution that leaves no room for constitutional decisions by other 
actors, in and out of the government—including constitutional decisions by the 
People of the kind so well described by Ackerman. Worse still, the idea that 
judicial review in the United States is based on a common law model is 
sometimes equated with the claim that the judges and justices themselves are, 
heroically, responsible for all the good developments in constitutional law. So 
it is important to put those misunderstandings aside. 
The common law method is a way of resolving legal issues. It can be used 
by judges, of course, but it can also be—and is, pretty frequently—used by 
legislators or executive officials. Members of legislative bodies routinely invoke 
the past practices of their institutions as arguments for proceeding in a certain 
way. The executive branch of the U.S. government even has a group of 
lawyers—the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice—that self-
consciously develops an intra-executive body of precedent to resolve 
constitutional issues, many of which will never make it to the courts. And quite 
apart from the formal processes of OLC, informal executive branch reliance on 
precedent is commonplace. For that matter, relying on precedent is an instinct 
even outside of distinctively legal settings—corporations, civic organizations, 
bureaucracies, and university faculties do it. People faced with a decision want 
to know what was done before. 
Relying on precedent is a good quick description of the common law 
approach, but it is an incomplete and possibly even misleading description. For 
 
21.  For an elaboration of this approach, see, for example, DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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one thing, “precedent” may be too narrow a term. There are several good 
reasons to look to precedent, but one of them is a recognition that you can 
learn from others’ experience. In the case of a judge, the experience need not 
be—in fact, it should not be—just the past decisions of other judges. Common 
law judges understood this. They (many of them, anyway) considered statutes 
to be another kind of precedent: statutes that did not directly address the 
problem before the court might still be relevant and helpful.22 One can see the 
descendant of this attitude in Justice Brennan’s use of the civil rights laws and 
the unratified ERA and even, maybe, in Ackerman’s idea that the civil rights 
laws should be part of the “constitutional canon.” 
Even beyond that, there are other kinds of relevant experience, from which 
one can learn, besides the actions of government bodies like courts and 
legislatures. Both historically and theoretically, the common law approach has 
used more general trends in society as a source of law. As I said, trends about 
women’s role in society and in the economy, not just trends in the law, surely 
played a role in the development of constitutional law as well. 
In all of these ways, it is a mistake to suppose that the common law 
approach exalts judges. In fact, the common law approach does not exclude We 
the People; in a sense, it allows popular opinion a wider role than Ackerman’s 
theory does. Ackerman focuses on political acts—legislation and executive 
action—and, to some degree, on popular mobilization for political causes. But 
once we recognize that constitutional law is not simply a matter of 
implementing decisions made by We the People through the processes that 
Ackerman describes, there is no reason to limit the people’s influence by taking 
into account only political acts. On a common law view, the non-political 
actions (or not explicitly political actions) of people should count, too: those 
actions can provide support for a decision, by a judge or someone else, about 
how the requirements of the Constitution should be understood. Women who 
entered the workforce in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s may not have 
been acting in the overtly political way characteristic of the We the People 
mentioned in the preamble or in Ackerman’s theory, but they were entitled to, 
and did, have an influence on constitutional law. 
 
22.  See, for example, a source that 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 34 n.15, appropriately 
recognizes: Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
12-13 (1936) (arguing that courts should consider a statute to be a “recognition of a policy” 
that might constitute “a social datum or . . . a point of departure for the process of judicial 
reasoning”). Justice Harlan’s opinion in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 
379-93 (1970), is a well-known example of this kind of use of statutes in common law 
decisionmaking. 
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Once the common law approach is described in this way—as drawing on 
“precedents” that go beyond court decisions, and beyond even government 
actions, to a range of political and non-political behavior—it risks seeming 
formless, something that can justify everything and nothing. Precedents can be 
interpreted in different ways and can point in different directions, especially if 
the category of precedents is defined so broadly. Now this point too can be 
overstated. Sometimes the precedents are really quite clear. Many 
constitutional issues, particularly in the lower courts, are resolved by 
straightforwardly following the decided cases, without any need or justification 
for venturing into the further reaches of analogous legislation, social practices, 
or anything else. But sometimes—certainly when the early sex discrimination 
cases, like Frontiero, came before the Supreme Court—there is an abundance of 
“precedential” (in the broad sense) material for the justices to invoke, and it 
does not all point in the same direction. In fact, the sex discrimination cases 
since the 1970s have systematically rejected what they called the “traditional” 
view of women’s role—a clear sign that the common law sources did not 
provide unequivocal support for sex equality, to say the least. 
This is the point at which the justices’ own views about the better result—
better as a matter of basic fairness or social policy—came into play. This, too, is 
a well-established feature of the common law. When the precedents are not 
clear—when there is a choice to be made—the judges’ views about social policy 
can play a role. That role is limited by the precedential (broadly understood) 
material. The common law approach enjoins a kind of intellectual humility: do 
not assume that you know better than all of the other people who, in one way 
or another, have grappled with the problem you are facing. But subject to that 
limit, the judge’s views properly play a role. 
Judicial review, with judges using a common law approach, is one of the 
institutions we have set up to deal with matters on which we don’t fully trust 
We the People. Certain elements of the design of the elected branches of the 
federal government can be seen in the same way. But judicial review is the most 
prominent institution. Judges exercising judicial review do a version of what 
judges have done for a long time in our system: they resolve issues by using 
common law methods. The People are not excluded from this process, for 
reasons I have said. But it would be a pretense to claim that what is going on, 
in courts that exercise the power of judicial review, is simply an 
implementation of the will of We the People. 
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Frontiero can be understood, easily, in 
common law terms—as can many other opinions, I believe. Justice Brennan 
relied on the analogy to race discrimination. Why was that a good argument? 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not think race and sex 
discrimination presented the same problems as each other. In Ackerman’s 
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telling, We the People, as I have said, may have condemned Jim Crow racial 
segregation, but there was no comparable consensus on sex discrimination. But 
the Court’s decisions on race discrimination—and society’s condemnation of it 
more generally—provided a precedent. The extension to sex discrimination 
was by no means automatic. That was the product of an independent judgment 
by the Justices. But it was not simply their judgment; Justice Brennan, in the 
tradition of the common law, and with an implicit acknowledgment of the 
importance of humility in making such judgments, enlisted the judgment of 
Congress, reflected in the civil rights laws and the proposed ERA, as a kind of 
precedent, too. 
Seen in this light, it is Justice Powell’s opinion that comes closer to 
Ackerman’s approach. This may be unfair to Ackerman, because Justice Powell 
thought it was important that there be a formal amendment to the 
Constitution, and Ackerman, correctly in my view, says that formal 
amendments do not matter so much. But Justice Powell was not satisfied with 
a common law-like justification for extending strict scrutiny to sex-based 
classifications. He wanted to hear from the People. On Ackerman’s theory, 
Justice Powell should have been willing to accept more informal expressions of 
what the People believed. But, as I have said, it is very difficult to make the case 
that We the People had reached even an informal consensus about sex 
discrimination in the early 1970s, as they arguably had about race 
discrimination. 
iv.  the civil  rights era reconsidered 
Even if I am right in suggesting that the common law provides a better 
model for American constitutional law as a whole, large portions of Professor 
Ackerman’s portrait of the constitutional developments of the civil rights era 
remain very convincing. Ackerman is persuasive in describing how a national 
consensus against Jim Crow segregation did develop. Civil rights groups and 
their leaders played a crucial role. Some politicians distinguished themselves; 
others got out of the way; some resisted, unsuccessfully. The broad waves of 
opinion between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s that Ackerman traces so 
expertly were certainly as significant as he says. 
But even some of the constitutional developments of the civil rights era 
required more than We the People. Ackerman, with characteristic insight, 
recognizes this. The cases that more or less bracket the era—Brown v. Board of 
Education23 and Loving v. Virginia24—are examples. Loving held that laws 
 
23.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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forbidding interracial marriages were unconstitutional. A common law-like 
justification of Loving—as a morally justified extension of Brown and other 
decisions—is straightforward. But it is hard to make the case that even in 1967, 
when Loving was decided, We the People thought that interracial marriages 
should be legal.25 Whether or not the Presidential election of 1968 can be seen 
as a referendum on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was certainly not a 
referendum on whether there was a constitutional right to interracial marriage. 
Public opinion polls in 1968 found that 75% of white Americans disapproved of 
interracial marriage and 56% thought the practice should be illegal.26 
Ackerman, of course, knows this. His justification for Loving relies on what 
he describes as a “supplementation thesis.”27 The Court, he explains, “wasn’t 
elaborating on a decision made by We the People; it was supplementing these 
decisions by entering a sphere that remained too hot for the political branches 
to handle.”28 In Ackerman’s view, Loving “simply represents an effort by We 
the Judges to fill in a gap left in the wake of an epochal set of decisions by We 
the People.”29 
But then the question is: why was Loving correctly decided? What justified 
the courts in supplementing the decisions of the People? Why weren’t the 
People allowed to leave the “gap” unfilled? To say that interracial marriage was 
too “hot” an issue for the political branches is to say that the People—if we 
aggregate their views in the way that our existing institutions do (or, for that 
matter, if we look at public opinion polls)—did not want to establish a 
constitutional right to interracial marriage. So where did that right come from? 
Ackerman does say that he wants to “deny that Loving deserves a central place 
in the civil rights canon.”30 But he says this because he disapproves of the 
reasoning of the opinion, which he believes departs from the principles of 
Brown. I am not sure that I agree with Ackerman’s reading of Loving, and in 
any event I am not sure that the specific reasoning of opinions matters that 
much. But all of that is another subject. The question is why Ackerman, having 
(to his credit) candidly recognized that the People did not support a right to 
 
24.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
25.  For a sustained argument to this effect, see Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 755, 821-25 (2011). 
26.  See id. at 825. 
27.  3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 291, 296, 300. 
28.  Id. at 296. 
29.  Id. at 291. 
30.  Id. 
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interracial marriage in 1967, does not say that Loving was premature and wrong 
at the time. 
The other question is about Brown itself. In Ackerman’s account, Brown 
initiated the development of a (non-textual) change in the Constitution.31 
Among other things, it prompted the other branches of government to act. All 
of that is very plausible; I think Brown was not the very beginning but rather 
itself a partial culmination, but in other respects what Ackerman says about 
Brown seems right. But on Ackerman’s account, why was Brown a lawful 
decision? 
A common law account can answer that question, just by showing how 
Brown had important antecedents.32 The judicial precedents alone—McCabe v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,33 Buchanan v. Warley,34 Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada,35 Sweatt v. Painter,36 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents 
for Higher Education37—arguably left little room for a claim that separate 
schools could be equal.38 Many other developments in society provided a kind 
of non-judicial (and non-governmental) precedent: World War II’s lessons 
about claims of racial superiority; the perceived imperatives of Cold War 
ideological competition; the growth of an African-American middle class; even 
the integration of major league baseball.39 All of these things provided enough 
of a backing to make it lawful, on a common law-like approach, for the Court 
to conclude that segregation was unacceptable. Of course that conclusion also 
rested, not entirely but in part, on the view that segregation was morally 
wrong—how could it not, and why should it not? The common law approach 
allows such a judgment to be a component of a lawful decision. 
The central point, though, is that these pre-Brown developments do not 
seem to be a part of Ackerman’s account of the constitutional change of the 
 
31.  See, e.g., id. at 5 (noting that Brown “put the issue of racial equality at the very center of a 
great generational debate”). 
32.  For an elaboration, see David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 862-68 (2007). 
33.  235 U.S. 151 (1914) 
34.  245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
35.  305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
36.  339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
37.  339 U.S. 637(1950). 
38.  See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 708 (1992) (“Given 
what came before, the real question is why Brown needed to be decided at all.”). 
39.  For an account of these developments, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 173-96 (2004). 
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civil rights era. His account is more compressed and also much neater.40 There 
are relatively clearly defined triggering events and turning points. Ackerman’s 
analysis of how the actions of the three branches fit together; of the various 
devices used, in different “spheres,” to attack Jim Crow and its remnants; of 
how the movement ultimately ran up against its limitations—all of these 
things, and many more, are immensely illuminating and ensure that this 
volume will be a classic work. 
But as a theory of constitutional change, I think it narrows the frame too 
much and leaves out a realistic degree of messiness. The U.S. Constitution did 
change as a result of the civil rights era, even if it was not amended. But the 
change cannot be treated as the decisive act of We the People in any realistic 
sense, and an attempt to treat it that way leaves no room for central features of 
our constitutional system. In the civil rights movement there was drama, and 
there were heroes, and there were turning points. But in the end it would be 
surprising if a constitutional change of such magnitude were not the result of a 
long, messy process. 
conclusion: a literal second reconstruction 
Ackerman’s view of American constitutionalism is coherent, illuminating, 
impressive, and distinctive. In fact I think it is more than distinctive: I think it 
leads to a quite radical conclusion. The conclusion, put in the strongest terms, 
is that Brown v. Board of Education and the other great cases of the civil rights 
revolution (like Loving) were correct but extra-legal, and that judicial review 
should be abandoned. 
If one believes unequivocally in rule by We the People, then it is hard to see 
why there should be a role for judicial review. As I said at the beginning, 
judicial review is an institution that can be justified by the need to protect 
minorities against the People. But one lesson of Ackerman’s book is that 
sometimes the People do a pretty good job of protecting minorities. Leaving 
Brown v. Board of Education aside, what the courts did best in the civil rights 
era, in Ackerman’s telling, was to get out of the way. In cases like Loving the 
Supreme Court did mop up some vestiges of Jim Crow that the political 
branches had left alone, and Supreme Court decisions provided rhetorical cover 
and an occasional prod to the other branches. But, as Ackerman emphasizes, 
the role of the courts (Brown aside) was secondary at best. The President and 
Congress led the charge, and the courts, mostly, validated what the President 
 
40.  See, e.g., 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 51 (“Higher lawmaking in America is never a matter of 
a single moment; it is an extended process, lasting a decade or two . . . .”). 
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and Congress did. In fact the other branches spent a lot of time and energy 
maneuvering around various obstacles that the Supreme Court’s precedents 
had put in their way. I think the radically limited role of the courts is not just a 
feature of Ackerman’s account of the civil rights era; it follows from an 
approach to the Constitution that places the Constitution squarely in the hands 
of We the People. 
In this way, Ackerman’s approach is aligned with that of judicial review 
skeptics, who deny that the elite contributions of judges are, on balance, a good 
thing.41 The skeptics point to all the times the Supreme Court has invalidated 
legislation that should not have been invalidated. (Everyone’s list will differ, 
but they all include Dred Scott v. Sandford,42 the mainstream lists include 
Lochner v. New York,43 and nearly everyone will have many other candidates.) 
The biggest problem for the skeptics, of course, is Brown and, more generally, 
the role of the Supreme Court in dismantling Jim Crow. 
I doubt that Ackerman wanted his account to give the skeptics a way to 
solve their problem, but I think it does just that. The civil rights era can be 
understood as the second phase of the Civil War era—literally the Second 
Reconstruction. The national consensus that developed—as Ackerman 
masterfully shows—was that Jim Crow had to be abolished. In order to abolish 
it, the federal government had to do some things that were of questionable 
legality. That was the understanding of Brown that some of its proponents had 
at the time: that it was justified not on conventional legal grounds, but as an 
extraordinary but necessary intervention in order to take a step toward solving 
an otherwise intractable political and moral problem. 
According to this way of thinking, Brown and Loving are not models of 
what the courts should do. They were extraordinary acts of questionable 
legality, justified by the need to eradicate an extraordinary problem in 
American society that military force, in the mid-nineteenth century, had not 
fully uprooted. To exaggerate the point, the actions of the Supreme Court 
during the civil rights revolution should be compared to the actions of the 
Union Army. On less extraordinary occasions (that is, every other occasion), 
the courts should stay on the sidelines. They are not needed to protect 
minorities; the People will do an adequate job of protecting women, gays, and 
 
41.  See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (2000); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION, at ch. 8 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
42.  60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
43.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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other minorities, just as the People—once they got going—did an adequate job 
of abolishing Jim Crow. On this account, we do not have to justify the form of 
elite rule that judicial review actually is, and we do not have to live with judicial 
decisions that mistakenly thwart the will of the People. The Constitution will 
belong to We the People. 
There are many details that will have to be worked out, of course. And, 
needless to say, this is not our system, and it does not seem likely to become 
our system any time soon. I doubt it is a vision that Ackerman endorses. But it 
is one that, perhaps unintentionally, his magisterial work suggests. For better 
or worse, rule by We the People, if we really mean it, will not leave much room 
for the courts. 
